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Article 5

RECENT CASE NOTES
CONTRACT-IMPLIED WARRANTY-NATURE OF-Plaintiff and defendant
entered into a contract wherein the former agreed to build a house. After
the building was completed and paid for, defects in the construction began
to appear and defendant called in plaintiff to make repairs. This action
was to foreclose a mechanic's lien for the compensation plaintiff claims
is due to him for such repairs. Defendant filed a counterclaim in which he
asked for $5,000 damages, alleging that the workmanship in the construction of the building was faulty and that as a result the stucco cracked, the
cement cracked, and one end of the building settled. Defendant appeals,
alleging as error the refusal of the court to strike out the judgment for
the reason that the counterclaim was an independent tort and couldn't be
connected with this cause of action, which arose out of the contract. Held,
judgment affirmed. "It is an implied part of every builder's contract that
he will use reasonable skill in his work, even though there is no stipulation
to that effect in the written instrument itself." Jose-Baltz Co. v. DeWitt,
Supreme Court of Indiana, June 25, 1931, 176 N. E. 864.
The connection of the doctrine of implied warranties with builder's
contracts, though novel, is not entirely new. Hartford Mill Co. v. Hartford
Tobacco Warehouse Co., 121 S. W. 477. Since implied warranties arise
out of sales whenever it is required by good faith (McClure v. Central
Trust Co., 165 N. Y. 108, 58 N. E. 777); or it is just from the surrounding
circumstances that the buyer should be protected (Biddle on Warranties
in the Sale of Chattels, cited in Haines v. Niece, 116 Mo. App. 499, 92
S. W. 919); or the transaction is of such a nature that the vendee necessarily relies upon the judgment and skill of the vendor (The Nimrod, 141
Fed. 215) ; this extension of the doctrine seems both logical and just. The
court here, however, although it probably wasn't necessary to sustain the
result below (Excelsior Clay Works v. De Camp, 40 Ind. App. 26, 80 N. E.
981), expressly held that implied warranties are contractural in nature,
saying "It is an implied part of every builder's contract * * *"
There are three possible methods of rationalizing the law of implied
warranties--contract, "quasi assumpsit?', and tort. There are great difficulties in the path of holding that the doctrine arises out of contract.
The American Law Institute in its Proposed Final Draft No. 1 of the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Sect., I, defines a contract as "a
promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy,
or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."
Professor Williston in his work on Contracts, Sec. 1, says that a contract
"is a promise, or set of promises, to which the law attaches legal obligation." These definitions clearly indicate that a promise is the very basis of
the contractual relationship. Sec 3 of the Restatement says "A promise is
an undertaking, however expressed, either that something shall happen, or
that something shall not happen, in the future. * * * Words which in terms
promise * * * the existence * * * of a present or past state of facts are to
be interpreted as a promise or undertaking to be answerable for such
proximate damage as may be caused by the * * * existence or non-existence
of the asserted state of facts." Sec. 5 of the same work states that a
''promise in a contract must be stated in such words either oral or written,
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or must be inferred wholly or in part from such conduct as justifies the
promisee in understanding that the promisor intended to make a promise."
In Sec. 19 the necessity for a manifestation of assent to the terms is pointed
out. In Williston on Contracts, Sec. 3, it is said that there cannot be a
true contract unless there is an expression of assent to the making of a
promise. In Page on Contracts this subject is discussed in sections 1436
and 1437, where it is maintained that a genuine implied contract can only
exist where the acts on one side indicate an offer and those on the other
side indicate an acceptance. These authorities, then, clearly show that
every obligation to be of contractural nature must be based upon a
promise, either expressed or implied in fact. An examination of the
cases will reveal that implied warranties do not arise from such facts. In
Hoe v. Sanborn., 21 N. Y. 552, 78 Am. Dec. 163, the court said, "implied
warranties do not rest on any supposed agreement in fact. They are obligations which the law raises upon principles foreign to the actual contract."
24 R. C. L., 178 contains the statement that "implied warranties arise by
implication of law, and they exist without any intention of the seller to
create them." In Hoover Allison Co. v. Wirtz, 15 N. D. 477, 107 N. W.
1078, it was held that where a contract provided that no agreement or
stipulation not contained therein would be recognized unless approved in
writing by the vendor, an action could be maintained upon an implied
warranty, which the court said was not a matter of agreement but arose
by operation of law. In spite of the difficulty pointed out and the general
trend of the decisions in which the nature of implied warranties has been
discussed, the cases hold, almost without exception, that they are to be
enforced as contracts. Hoe v. Sanborn, supra; Street, Foundations of
Legal Liabilities, Vol. 1 P. 389.
Prof. T. A. Street, in his work Foundations of Legal Liabilities, vol. 2,
p 237, classifies this subject under the head of "quasi assumpsit." He
contends that the law proceeds upon the assumption that there is an
implied assumpsit (undertaking), arising out of the facts of the case,
upon the part of the party in the wrong to reimburse the other to the
extent of the damage which has been imposed by him upon the other.
An examination of Sec. 5 of the Restatement, of Sec. 3 of Williston, op. cit.,
and of sec. 1437 of Page, op. cit., will show that those authorities favor
classifying as quasi contractual those obligations which arise by operation
of law. Whatever may be the present state of the law, it is undeniably
true that the doctrine originally had its foundation in tort. An examination
of some of those cases in which the law of implied warranties was first
developed conclusively shows that it was based upon the idea of deception
and sprang out of the law of deceit. Dale's Case, Cro. Eliz., 44; I Viner's
Abridgment, 587; Furnis v. Leiscester, Cro. Jaq., 474, 79 Eng. Rep. (Full
Reprint) 404. Street, op. cit., vol. 2, Chapter 27, citing these cases and
others, points out this as the basis of the law upon this subject. Modern
courts still recognize tort as the parent of implied warranties and point
out that the doctrine as it now exists is close to tort in principle. In
Hoe v. Sanborn, supra, the court said, "* * * They (implied warranties)
are raised on * * * principles which are strictly analagous to those upon
which vendors are held liable for fraud." Thus it appears that the
whole structure of this branch of the law indicates tort very strongly.
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As has been pointed out above, however, implied warranties are almost
universally enforced as contracts. An examination of the authorities will
reveal that the reason is not the fact that the doctrine is contractual in
nature, but that it is more convenient to enforce it in that manner.
Hoe v. Sanborn, supra; Street, op. cit., vol. I, p. 389. Street adds that it
was not until the time of Blackstone that the action changed from caseto assumpsit.
It seems, then, that to rationalize this subject we must say that the law
of implied warranties originally arose out of tort, that it is still tort in
principle (or is of a quasi contractural nature-in which case it would
still be close to tort), and that it is enforced as a contract as a matter of
convenience.
W.H.H.
CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-GUARANTY-The Bank of Linn Grove.
claimed as a set-off, in an action against the receiver of the Wells County
Bank, an amount claimed to be due on a contract between the Wells County
Bank and Thomas J. McKean, the Bank of Linn Grove being the assignee
of McKean's rights under the contract. McKean purchased from the Wells
County Bank certain notes and mortgages which were executed to it and
received receipts, the bank retaining possession of the notes and mortgages
and agreeing to collect the interest and look after the mortgages. The
bank was to retain 1% of the interest provided for, so that if the instrument drew 6% interest, McKean was to receive only 5%. The purchaserdid not investigate the titles nor the value of the security. He was assured
that they were good and that the bank was "back of them," and it was
agreed that he be paid the face of the mortgage and accrued interest at
any time on surrender of the receipt. The purchaser understood that the
bank was guaranteeing the notes and the bank agreed to repurchase them
from him at any time he desired them to do so. Held, the promise of
the bank was a promise to answer for the debts and defaults of others
within Burns (1926) Sec. 8045. Bank of Linn Grove v. Stults, Appellate
Court of Indiana, June 18, 1931. 176 N. E. 707.
While writers are agreed that no promise which differs in scope from
that of another obligor is within the statute, they are not agreed as towhether a new promise to pay irrespective of the liability of any original
debtor is within the statute, and there is little authority on the point.
Williston on Contracts, Sec. 455 et seq. If in this case the court has
correctly stated the facts in saying that "it was agreed that he be paid
the fact of the mortgage and accrued interest at any time on surrender of
the receipt" and "the bank agreed to repurchase the notes from him at any
time he desired them to do so," then it would seem that Indiana has adopted
the rule that a promise to pay at all events is not a promise different in
scope from the original obligation, and therefore falls within the statute.
Many eminent writers and jurists believe that the statute of frauds occasions injustice in as many cases as those in which it tends to prevent
frauds, and the tendency of courts in most jurisdictions in modern times
is to take cases out of the statute wherever there is a well established judicial exception recognized concerning the application of the statute. See
The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism, by Hugh E. Willis, in 3
Ind. L. Journal 427 and 528.

